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It has been assumed that arbitrage profits are not possible in efficient markets, because future
prices are not predictable. Here we show that predictability alone is not a sufficient measure of
market efficiency. We instead propose to measure inefficiencies of markets in terms of the maximal
profit an ideal trader can take out from a market. In a stock market model with an evolutionary
selection of agents this method reveals that the mean relative amount of realizable profits P is very
limited and we find that it decays with rising number of agents in the markets. Our results show
that markets may self-organize their collective dynamics such that it becomes very sensitive to profit
attacks which demonstrates that a high degree of market efficiency can coexist with predictability.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh., 05.45.-a., 05.65.+b., 87.23.Kg., 02.50.Le.
Many complex systems in nature and society consist of
rather simple elements whose interactions self-organize in
a way that the available dynamics of the system achieves
a desired performance. In brains, for instance, indi-
vidual neurons can realize only rather simple functions
while their interactions are permanently re-adapted to
ultimately yield successful behavior in non-stationary en-
vironments. Further examples are found in the metabolic
and genetic networks in cells [1]. It has been suspected,
that also collective human behavior can sometimes be
described in a similar way [2]. A particularly promi-
nent example for social interactions is a market in which
each trader has only limited access to relevant informa-
tion, while the dynamics of the whole system is consid-
ered to exploit the overall information quite effectively
[3]. In economy it is believed that the collective behavior
of traders leads to an efficient market such that in real
markets no profit can be made from an analysis of price
time series [4, 5]. However, since high frequency data are
available research has revealed that some temporal cor-
relations in price time series do in fact exist. But it is
still an open question whether these correlations imply
inefficiencies (see [6] for an overview). For a solution of
this problem it would be highly desirable to have a quan-
titative measure of inefficiency [7], for which, however,
no generally accepted definition has been proposed until
now.
Former studies of efficiency were challenged by possi-
ble irrationalities of traders in the market. They either
postulated a market of rational traders or tried to mea-
sure efficiency of real markets [6]. The drawback of these
approaches is that in the first a comparison to real mar-
kets in principle cannot be complete, while the second
lacked a clear definition of irrelevant noise and meaning-
ful information.
In this paper we propose a novel measure of inefficiency
and apply it to a model which combines the approaches of
evolutionary games [8] and agent-based models [9]. The
method we propose for measuring the inefficiency of a dy-
namical system modeling a market is general and can be
applied to other models and in principle also to real mar-
kets. In our view our approach is the first step towards
an objective measure of efficiency of stock markets.
Our starting point is to consider a market as an open
dynamical system µ. The future return rt+1 = (pt+1 −
pt)/pt then is given by
rt+1 = µ(Φt), (1)
where pt is the price at time t. Φt denotes all parameters
determining the next price including the actions of the
traders participating in the market at time t.
This formulation of a market shows why it is not
straightforward to use the notion of predictability for
defining efficiency: a dynamical system can in principle
be perfectly predicted if all of its constituents are known.
Making profit, however, for every trader requires to in-
teract with the dynamics of a market. If an external
additional trader enters the market at time t her inter-
actionW will influence the resulting returns
r˜t+1 = µ
′(Φt,W) (2)
and will thereby also modify the profit the trader can
achieve. Note that µ′(Φt,0) = µ(Φt).
For the purpose of analyzing a given market model we
can formally close a given system with respect to capital
and information by using a procedure analogous to the
notion of baths in thermodynamics. This is done by as-
suming that the system is coupled to an ideal trader T
who has perfect knowledge of the system and infinite re-
sources. Furthermore, we assume T always chooses her
interaction with the market such that she achieves the
maximal profit possible. Clearly, the ideal situation of
complete information is very artificial and in reality only
a small part of the information determining the dynam-
ics µ is available to a trader. However, the profit of this
ideal trader per definition provides a strict upper bound
on the profit achievable by any trader.
2In a simple stock market with one risk less asset M e.g.
cash and a single stock S the optimal interaction of the
ideal trader can be represented by the amount of M and
a price limit p for buying or selling, i.e. W = (M,p).
In the following we assume that T always chooses the
optimal value for p such that the strength of interaction
is characterized solely by the magnitude of risk less assets
M she is willing to exchange.
The ideal trader T would buy stocks with M > 0, if
the return r˜t+1 resulting from her interaction would be
positive. If in contrast the return r˜t+1 resulting from an
interaction would be negative the ideal trader sell her
stocks with M < 0. The profit is calculated according to
the difference between buying and selling at time t+ 1:
Pt(M) =
M
Mtot
r˜t+1(M). (3)
M = pS denotes the value of the stocks at time t the
trader buys or sells measured in risk less assets. Mtot
denotes the total value of risk less assets present in the
market. The profit is equivalent to the amount of risk less
assets ∆MMtot =
Mt+1−Mt
Mtot
the ideal trader could virtually
win in one time step. This can be seen as the relative loss
of money of the participants in the market potentially
transferred to the ideal trader.
Using all information, the ideal trader will also take
into account her own influence on the market [10] in order
to optimize her profit Pt in every time step t:
Pˆt = Pt(Mˆt) = max
M
Pt(M). (4)
Assuming that Pt(M) is differentiable we obtain for
the optimal invested capital
Mˆt = −
r˜t+1(Mˆt)
∂M r˜t+1(Mˆt)
. (5)
For the optimal profit then follows:
Pˆt(Mˆt) = −
r˜2t+1(Mˆt)
∂M r˜t+1(Mˆt)
(6)
This equation shows that the optimal profit consists of
two contributions: The nominator represents the volatil-
ity of the return, resulting from the interaction with T.
The denominator characterizes the responsiveness of the
market to increasing M , and reflects the sensitivity of
the system.
The main problem of determining the inefficiency
of a market is to specify r˜(M). One can in principle
estimate this function in experiments or measure it in
model markets (see below) or one can postulate generic
properties of this function and analyze the effect on the
inefficiency [11]. We define the defensiveness of a market
as δt(M) =
rt+1
|rt+1|
(r˜t+1(M) − rt+1). One might expect
that for an optimal order |Mˆ | > 0, the market reaction
will be defensive and δ will be negative (see in Fig. 1
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FIG. 1: Example of a price time series (solid line) and pos-
sible changes of it, if an ideal trader buys stocks at time t.
When an additional buy order is placed, the price at time t
will always be higher than without interaction (arrow at t).
The value of the returns at t + 1 depends on the market dy-
namics and reflects the rationality of the traders. The dashed
line shows an example characteristic for a defensive market in
which δt(M) < 0. The dotted line shows a price history for a
non-defensive reaction (δt(M) > 0).
the dashed line). While for large orders any realistic
market, as e.g. the example below, will ensure this, for
intermediate orders and irrational traders a market can
be non-defensive (δ > 0)(see in Fig. 1 the dotted line).
In the latter case, the ideal trader will maximally exploit
these irrationalities of a market which leads to the
counterintuitive result that a feedback of knowledge into
a market can in principle increase its overall volatility.
We illustrate the determination of r˜ and how one can
measure the efficiency using a simple order-based stock
market model. Our model reproduces the statistics of
empirical market returns to an astonishing large degree,
including characteristic scaling of return distributions
and strong temporal correlations of volatility (volatility
clusters). Because this model and it’s properties have
been described in detail before [12] we here outline only
its main constituents.
In our model N agents trade by swapping stocks into
cash and vice versa. Initially every agent i receives S0
stocks and an amount M0 of cash. The decision of each
agent to buy or to sell stocks is determined by a set of n
parameters αi∆t(∆t = 0, ..., (n− 1)) and is based on the
history of the returns rt−1, rt−2, ..., rt−n+1. The parame-
ters define simple linear prediction models for each agent
and are randomly drawn from a normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1.
Every iteration of the model yields the next return. It
can be divided in three parts: First, the agents make a
prognosis of two successive future returns rˆt, rˆt+1 based
on their individual parameters of the linear prediction
3model.
rˆit = α
i
0 +
τ∑
∆t=1
αi∆tr(t−∆t)
rˆit+1 = α
i
0 + α
i
1rˆ
i
t +
τ∑
∆t=2
αi∆tr(t−∆t+ 1).
Then the agents decide to buy/sell stocks if they pre-
dict that the second return rˆt+1 is positive/negative. In
the second part each agent i places an order, which is
stored in an order book. The overall demand D(p) and
supply O(p) of the stocks is calculated according to a
limit price given by the agents and the size of the orders.
Si is the total number of stocks agent i place in its order
respectively ∆Si = int[M
i
pˆi
t
] the number of stocks agent i
is willing to buy with her money M i:
O(p) =
∑
i:rˆi
t+1
<0
SiΘ(p− pˆit)
D(p) =
∑
i:rˆi
t+1
>0
∆SiΘ(pˆit − p),
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function. After the
orders are placed, a turnover function is calculated. That
is the minimum of both functions at price p:
Z(p) = min{O(p), D(p)}
In order to determine the new price the minimum
and the maximum argument of Z(p) at the interval of
the maximum turnover pmin = min(argmax Z(p)) and
pmax = max(argmax Z(p)) are computed and the new
price is then defined by the weighted mean between these
two points:
p(t) =
pminO(pmin) + pmaxD(pmax)
O(pmin) +D(pmax)
In the last step of each iteration one agent is replaced
by a new random one. In case of an evolutionary update
the poorest agent is replaced. To investigate the effects
of evolution on efficiency we also consider the case where
a randomly chosen agent becomes replaced in each step.
Previously we have shown that for large N the return
distributions have a stationary and characteristic shape.
While the shape of the distributions varies for the differ-
ent evolutionary mechanisms [12], the variances 〈r2t 〉 for
both cases are nearly equal and enter a constant value
for sufficiently many traders N > 1000 (see dashed line
in Fig. 2).
The ideal trader applied to our model maximizes the
amount of money she virtually gets from the system with-
out giving stocks away. The only free variable the ideal
trader can optimize is the money she uses to buy or
sell shares. Following Eqn. 3 she maximizes her profit
Pt(Mt). To do this, the trader has to place an order in
the order book. For every price p one can calculate a
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FIG. 2: Variance 〈r2t 〉 of the returns in the undisturbed model
versus number of agents N (dashed line). The circles indicate
the variances 〈r˜2t 〉 of 10 runs of the system interacting with
the ideal trader T averaged from 500 simulation steps. Full
line: variance averaged from the 10 simulations (circles).
spread σ(p) between offered shares O(p) and demanded
shares D(p):
σ(p) = O(p) −D(p)
If at time t T would buy S =int[Mp ] shares, she placed
an order at the lowest p with S ≥ σ(p). This leads
to a new demand function and therefore to a new price
p˜t+1. The procedure for selling is analogous. To calcu-
late the optimal profit Pˆ (see Eqn. 4) the ideal trader
repeats this procedure for all possible values of M , and
finally invests the optimal amount of capital Mˆt. Per
construction T does not further interact with the mar-
ket in the subsequent time step, which makes the profit
Pˆt in fact virtual. After estimating Pˆt the influence of
T on market is canceled and the method is applied de
novo in the next time step. For our market model this
approach corresponds to an interaction which does not
change the nature of the system. It provides a strict up-
per bound on the profit achievable by any realistic trader
who in contrast would need to interact with the market
a least twice (e.g first buy and then sell). Our method
avoids this more realistic scenario because such an inter-
action would effectively remove stocks (or money) from
the market which can change the dynamics of the system
substantially and thereby will prevent a reliable charac-
terization of the market’s properties.
In Fig. 2 one can see that especially in the case of
small N the volatility becomes strongly amplified, while
for larger N the market becomes much more defensive.
Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the am-
plification of the cases with and without evolution (not
shown).
Fig. 3 shows that the mean of the optimal investment
in units of the total money in the market drops with a
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FIG. 3: The mean relative size of an optimal order 〈 Mˆ
Mtot
〉
(measured in risk less assets) versus the number of traders N .
Circles mark the mean size of one simulation run calculated
from 500 simulation time steps. The line is the mean from
the different simulation runs.
102 103 104
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
P(
Mo
pt
)
N
FIG. 4: Mean of the optimal profit Pˆ an ideal trader can
achieve in the market depending on the number of agents.
Circles show the mean optimal profit averaged over 500 sim-
ulation time steps. The line is the mean over this 10 simula-
tions.
power law, i.e. |Mˆt|Mtot ∝ N
−1/2. We find that the ideal
invested capital in a market without evolution always
lies above the market with evolution and on average is a
factor of 1.39 ± 0.35 greater (not shown). Both results
clearly have an influence on the mean profit P an ideal
trader can achieve in our market (see Fig. 4). We find
that the possible profit P in a market with evolution is
for all N smaller and is on average only 44%±29% of the
average profit P of the case of random agent replacement.
Eqn. 6 indicates that this effect is mainly caused by the
sensitivity r˜′(M) of the system because the variances do
not differ in both markets. Furthermore, we see that the
highest achievable profit is decreasing for a rising number
of agents. In the regime N > 1000 the decrease of P is
mainly due to the fact that Mˆ is getting smaller. Most
striking are the absolute values of P. Taking into account
that the agents of our market model are not very smart,
the fraction of capital the ideal trader can get in one
time step on average is below 1% in the case of 1000
agents and below 0.1% for 20000 agents. Our results
furthermore indicate that the profit T can achieve in the
market might fall with a power law ∝ N−1/2 which would
imply a vanishing profit opportunity for any trader in the
thermodynamic limit.
Prediction of financial time series is an interesting and
challenging topic of research on its own. Our analysis,
however, shows that predictability alone is not sufficient
to characterize the efficiency of a market. Markets can
have different degrees of defensiveness and sensitivity,
which limits the profit possible for any trader. Our model
not only illustrates the notion of the ideal trader, but
shows that the profit option for a trader might vanish
if the market is large. Furthermore, the comparison of
the evolutionary market with the case of random replace-
ments of agents underlines the long standing hypothesis
that efficiency of markets might emerge from Darwinian
mechanisms. Finally, our measure of inefficiency is gen-
eral enough to be applicable to every well defined market
model and can be used to analyze simple models [11]. We
believe our novel method to measure market inefficiencies
paves the way towards a systematic understanding of the
influences of irrationalities of traders and we expect it will
help to better understand the dynamics of real markets.
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